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Universal Jurisdiction and the Pirate:
Time for an Old Couple to Part

ABSTRACT

For hundreds of years, the world has allowed any nationstate to exercise universal jurisdiction over high seas piracy.
This has been recently codified by the United Nations in the
Convention on the Law of the Seas. It has been almost
universally assumed that allowing states to do this was
legitimate. As this Note will argue, however, the reasons for
allowing states to exercise jurisdiction in this way no longer
make sense in the modern world. Further, allowing states to
exercise universal jurisdiction over pirates violates the due
process rights of the pirates and poses a threat to international
stability. To address these concerns, this Note proposes
prohibiting states from exercising universal jurisdiction over
pirates and instead requiring that states wishing to exercise
jurisdiction over pirates base that jurisdiction on a more
traditionaljurisdictionalform.
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I. INTRODUCTION

On November 5, 2005, a band of pirates attacked the Seabourn
Spirit, a luxury cruise liner, 100 miles off the Somali coast. They
attacked from a small boat with grenade launchers and machine
guns.' The attack caught the world's attention and prompted several
questions. What can be done about piracy in general, and how can it
be stopped? How can the pirates that attacked the Seabourn Spirit be
found and captured? Who should be responsible for finding and
capturing them? And once a country does find and capture the
pirates, how should it punish them?
Throughout history, scholars and politicians have attempted to
answer the question of how to stop piracy. 2 Yet, piracy remains a
problem. Unfortunately, piracy is likely to continue to be a problem
for the foreseeable future. While unable to solve the piracy problem in
general, politicians and scholars seem to agree about who can capture
and punish the pirates. If a country finds the pirates within its
territorial waters, it can capture and punish the pirates under its

1.
Rodrique Ngowi, Luxury Cruise Ship Outruns Pirates off Coast of Somalia,
BUFFALO NEws, Nov. 6, 2005, at A4.
2.
Pompey just tried to eradicate the society of pirates in the Mediterranean of
Ancient Rome. See infra Part II.A. England would hang pirates at the low water mark,
to show that the convict was within the jurisdiction of the admiralty, and would often
hang the bodies in chains to serve as a reminder of what happens to pirates. DAVID
CORDINGLY, LIFE AMONG THE PIRATES: THE ROMANCE AND THE REALITY 259-61 (1995).
Several countries granted letters of marque in an attempt to use piratical tactics to
help the country. Id. at 6. Today, there is the International Maritime Bureau's piracy
reporting center in Kuala Lumpur. See International Chamber of Commerce [ICC]
Commercial Crime Services, IMB Piracy Reporting Center: Overview, http://www.iccccs.org/prc/overview.php (providing an overview of the piracy reporting center).
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municipal law. On the high seas, any country may capture the pirates
and punish them according to the capturing country's laws. Thus, if
the Brazilian Navy found and captured the Somali pirates on the
high seas despite no obvious connection between Brazil and the
pirates or the cruise ship, Brazil could capture the pirates and subject
them to Brazilian law. This concept is known as universal
jurisdiction, and it is this Note's focus.
According to some legal scholars, universal jurisdiction is a
deeply entrenched exception to the norms of international jurisdiction
that has developed over the past several hundred years. 3 The concept
of universal jurisdiction has been codified in the U.N. Convention on
the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).
On the high seas, or in any other place outside the jurisdiction of any
The courts of the State
State, every State may seize a pirate ship ....
which carried out the seizure may decide upon the penalties to be
imposed .... 4

Under this article, if a pirate from country A attacks a vessel from
country B on the high seas, country C has the right to capture the
pirate, subject him to country C's laws, and punish him according to
those laws. Country C can do this even though it has no tie to the
pirate or the vessel attacked. By reviewing piracy's history,
comparing universal jurisdiction with other forms of jurisdiction, and
discussing why the reasons once given for allowing states to exercise
universal jurisdiction over pirates are no longer applicable, this Note
will show that pirates should no longer be subject to universal
jurisdiction.
Part II of this Note provides a brief history of piracy itself. To
understand why universal jurisdiction was originally applied to
piracy, it is important to understand how piracy was originally
viewed and how this view has changed over time. This Note considers
three major periods: piracy in the ancient world, piracy from the time
of Sir Francis Drake through the 1720s, and piracy in the twentieth
century. These periods are important to the development of the
principle of universal jurisdiction. While it would certainly be
entertaining to recount the story of the Queen Anne's Revenge and her
travels prior to ending up at the bottom of Beaufort inlet, this Note
will avoid telling such legends and focus instead on why and how
piracy was punished during these periods.
Part III of this Note will review how courts and legal scholars
have viewed international jurisdiction in general and as applied to
piracy. It will also analyze the historical reasons for allowing states to

WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 4 COMMENTARIES, 71; LOUIS HENKIN, INTERNATIONAL
3.
LAW: POLITICS AND VALUES 240 (1995).
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 105, Nov. 16, 1994,
4.
1883 U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter UNCLOS].
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exercise universal jurisdiction over pirates. Further, Part III will also
show that those reasons no longer apply to modern piracy.
Part IV will explain why states should not be allowed to exercise
universal jurisdiction over piracy; doing so creates an unnecessary
risk of international tension as well as violates notions of due process.
This will be based mostly on lessons learned from the application of
the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution to issues of personal
jurisdiction in the United States.
Part V will suggest alternative ways the international
community can deal with piratical jurisdiction. Despite scholarly
comment, bases of jurisdiction other than universal jurisdiction are
applicable to pirates on the high seas. Use of these other forms of
jurisdiction ensures no one is denied due process and prevents some
of the tension that may result in the international community if a
country were to misuse universal jurisdiction.
II. PIRACY'S HISTORY
A brief history of piracy is important to understand the reasons
why states were initially allowed to exercise universal jurisdiction
over pirates and why it is still allowed today. Thus, Part II will first
discuss piracy as it existed in the ancient world. This Part will focus
on two subjects: the history of the word piracy and how the Ancient
Greeks and Romans viewed piracy. Then, the discussion will shift to
piracy during the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries.
Lastly, there will be a brief discussion of modern piracy.
A. Piracy in the Ancient World
What is commonly thought of as piracy has existed for thousands
of years. The Ancient Greeks used two different words to describe
piracy: Xqlo-ui (leistes) and neupa-ul (peirates).5 Homer and other
Greek writers of the Classical period (c. 500-330 B.C.) used the word
7
leistes.6 It described both an armed robber and a plunderer at sea.
Historians cannot find any use of the word peirates firmly dated
before 267 B.C.8 But, like leistes, it described both what is now
considered piracy as well as land based banditry. 9
The Romans also used two different words to describe piracy:
praedo and pirata.The latter is a derivative of the Greek peiratesand

5.
6.

PHILIP DE SOUZA, PIRACY IN THE GRAECO-ROMAN WORLD 3 (1999).
Id.

7.

Id.

8.
9.

Id. at 5.
Id. at 8.
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is the word from which the English word "pirate" is derived.' 0 Praedo
and pirata described both land based bandits and sea-faring
pirates." While the word "pirate" may have ancient roots, the
meaning of the word has changed to cover only sea-based robbery. It
is important to remember when ancient writers used words like
peirates and pirata,they were not necessarily referring to the modern
day view of piracy.
Early historians have suggested that the act of piracy can be
traced back to the beginnings of navigation. "From the time when
men first went down to the sea in ships, piracy and robbery have been
12
regarded only as one of the means of livelihood that the sea offered.'
It is tempting to talk about piracy dating back to the second
millennium B.C.' 3 There are records that show that ships were
sailing the Mediterranean by 1200 B.C., and there are scenes that
depict fighting at sea around 1190 B.C.1 4 Thucydides wrote that
Minos cleared the sea of pirates around 1700 B.C. 1 5 But reliable
16
evidence is lacking to show that people practiced piracy at this time.
17
It is not until the Homeric poems that piracy is first mentioned.
The concept of piracy in the Homeric poems is different from the
modern day concept of piracy in other ways as well. The aims and
methods of piracy and warfare were "virtually indistinguishable in
the Homeric World."' 8 Homer mentions piracy several times in the
Odyssey in addition to his tales of the story's heroes, but there seems
to be little difference between the heroes and pirates. "[B]oth ...set
off in their long ships to distant shores to plunder and kill. The
difference ... seems only to be their god-given fate."'19 In the Homeric
poems, piracy is "an evil business" and looked upon unfavorably. Yet,
the practice of piracy could bring higher status and prestige to the
20
pirate due to the fighting involved and the wealth one could obtain.

10.
11.

Id. at 12-13.
Id. at 13.

12.

HENRY A. ORMEROD, PIRACY IN THE ANCIENT WORLD 13 (Johns Hopkins

Univ. Press 1997) (1924).
13.

DE SOUZA, supra note 5, at 15.

14.

Id.

15.

Id.; ORMEROD, supra note 12, at 80. Ormerod claims that archaeological

evidence proves that Minos actually did clear the seas. ORMEROD, supra note 12, at 80.
However, modern historians seem to believe this is nothing more than a myth with no
historical basis. DE SOUZA, supra note 5, at 16.
16.
DE SOUZA, supra note 5, at 16.

17.
Id. at 17. This does not necessarily mean that piracy did not exist before
this time, only that the historical record has not yielded any reliable evidence of its
existence. The largest problem with the historical record of the period before the
Homeric poems is that there seems to be no distinction between piracy and warfare. Id.
at 16.

18.

Id. at 18.

19.

Id. at 19.

20.

Id. at 21.
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During the Classical Greek period, writers referred to almost anyone
who attacked another on the open sea as a pirate. 21 The victim of an
attack would call the attacker a pirate and the attacker would
22
consider himself to be conducting a legitimate form of warfare.
Piracy plagued not only the Greeks but also the Romans. For
example, pirates captured a young Julius Cesar in 75 B.C. and held
him for ransom. 23 Around the same time, piracy became such a
serious problem that it, along with other factors, caused a grain
shortage and threatened to provoke riots in Rome. 24 This led to a
number of military actions culminating in Pompey "clearing" the
25
Mediterranean of pirates.
Part of the reason that examining piracy in the ancient world is
so difficult is because the Greeks and Romans also used the words
peirates and pirata to refer to "undesirable 'others."' 26 For many
communities that coexisted with the Greeks and Romans, the modern
day understanding of piracy was viewed as a legitimate way of life,
and had been for generations prior to the rise of Rome. 27 These
communities were similar to the Viking communities of the 800s
A.D. 28 Thus, when historians write of Pompey clearing the sea of
pirates, he was clearing the sea of a group of communities that posed
a threat to Roman hegemony. 29 These communities posed a threat to
Roman hegemony because the piracy they practiced disrupted Roman
trade. The formerly legitimate lifestyle these communities practiced
was anachronistic in the modern commercial world that was ancient
30
Rome.
To the Romans, pirates were more than just those who
plundered Roman ships. They were communities that did not follow

21.
22.

Id. at 41.
Id.

23.
Id. at 140; see also DANIEL DEFOE, A GENERAL HISTORY OF THE ROBBERIES
AND MURDERS OF THE MOST NOTORIOUS PYRATES 18-20 (Garland Publishing 1972)

(1724) (providing a historical account of this event possibly mixed with some
embellishment). This edition lists DeFoe as the author, but it is now believed that the
mysterious Capt. Johnson is the true author. See PHILIP N. FURBANK & W. ROBERT
OWENS, THE CANONISATION OF DANIEL DEFOE 100-21 (1988) (explaining why the work
was initially attributed to Defoe, why the reasoning supporting the attribution was
faulty, and concluding that the identity of Captain Johnson remains an open mystery).
24.

DE SOUZA, supra note 5, at 142-43.

25.
See generally id. at 149-78 (describing the events leading up to Pompey's
sweeping the sea of piracy and the immediate aftermath as well as how effective, or
ineffective, this clearing truly was).
26.
Id. at 2.
27.
Alfred Rubin, The Law of Piracy, 63 U.S. NAVAL WAR C. INT'L L. STUD. 6
(1988).
See id. at 8 (comparing the classification of pirate to that of the "Viking"
28.
which is used today to "evoke a way of life legitimate within the harsh legal order of
the middle ages).
29.
Id. at 6.
30.
Id.
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the rules of war because they did not go through the formalities of
declaring war before attacking. 31 The Romans believed that these
pirate communities were in a "permanent state of 'war"' with
everyone around them. 3 2 Further, in ancient Rome, unlike today,
"[lthe word [piracy] did not imply criminality under any legal system,
Roman or law of nations. '33 Instead, Romans applied it to organized
societies whose religious order and social organization were not
"shockingly different" than those around them. 34
There are several things to remember about ancient piracy
throughout this Note. First, while the English word "pirate" can be
traced to ancient roots, its meaning has changed. Further, what the
ancients considered piracy and what is now considered piracy are not
the same. The assumption that ancient piracy was the same as
modern piracy is part of the problem with the current application of
universal jurisdiction to piracy as will become clear later.
B. Piracyfrom the Sixteenth to the Early Eighteenth Century
This Part will begin by discussing Sir Francis Drake and Henry
Morgan. This discussion will serve to illustrate how sixteenth and
seventeenth century Europe viewed piracy. The discussion will then
shift to changing views of piracy in Europe, and England in
particular. Lastly, this Part will discuss the rationales countries gave
for punishing piracy.
Sir Francis Drake was a pirate in the eyes of history, even if
neither he nor his country viewed him as such. Although he flew the
flag of England while attacking vessels and told his victims that he
acted on the behalf of England, he plundered Spanish towns and
vessels at a time when Spain and England were not at war. 35 His
victims showed admiration at the humane way he treated them. After
attacking the Nuestra Sehora de la Concepci6n in 1579, Drake gave
gifts and a letter of safe passage to her captain after unloading all of
36
the ship's cargo.
Despite the fact that England and Spain were not at war,
England did not punish Drake, much to the dismay of the Spaniards.
In fact, Queen Elizabeth knighted Drake in 1581 aboard his ship the
Golden Hind.37 She had good reason for doing so. Not only was Drake

31.
Id. at 12; see id. at 9-10 (reprinting Livy's description of the ritual which
would formally declare war in the ancient Roman world).
32.
Id. at 12.
33.
Id.
34.
Id.
35.
PETER R. GALVIN, PATTERNS OF PILLAGE: A GEOGRAPHY OF CARIBBEANBASED PIRACY IN SPANISH AMERICA, 1536-1718, at 42 (1999).
36.
DAVID CORDINGLY, UNDER THE BLACK FLAG: THE ROMANCE AND THE
REALITY OF LIFE AMONG THE PIRATES 30 (1995).
37.
GALVIN, supra note 35, at 42.
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disrupting Spanish commerce and Spain's exploitation of the New
38
World as she had asked (without giving him an actual commission),
he also brought back five tons of silver along with other treasure. It is
estimated that he enhanced the royal treasury by £500,000, which in
39
1995 would have been worth more than £68 million.
Henry Morgan also plundered Spanish America, but did so
during the latter half of the seventeenth century. 40 The governor of
Jamaica (which was an English colony at the time) gave him a
commission to attack the Spanish. 4 1 Each time he attacked though,
he went well beyond the commission's authority. 42 Instead of
punishing Morgan, the governor overlooked the overreaching and
embraced the money and treasure that Morgan gave him. 43 It was not
until Morgan plundered and burned Panama to the ground that the
authorities brought Morgan to trial. 44 The King of Spain was so
outraged over the attack that the English had no choice but to try
him. As his punishment, the King of England knighted him and sent
him back to Jamaica where the King made him the Deputy Governor
45
of the island.
Sir Francis Drake and Henry Morgan are viewed as patriotic
pirates. During the majority of the sixteenth century, England did not
discourage piracy, but actually encouraged it and viewed its pirates
as national heroes. The Dutch and French also lionized their
pirates. 46 How could the Queen of England be upset with Sir Francis
Drake for his plundering of the Spanish, even though the two
countries were not at war, when his plundering made such a
generous contribution to the royal treasury? 47 This trend would be
48
reversed by the early eighteenth century.
From the 1700s to the 1720s, England began to crack down on
piracy. It is at this time that pirates like Blackbeard and John Gow
roamed the seas. What led to this change in policy? Scholars believe
that the consolidation of state sovereignty, the rise of mercantilist
economic theories, developments in international laws and diplomacy,
and the growing influence of the mercantile class are the chief

38.
39.
40.

CYRus HARRELD KARRAKER, PIRACY WAS A BuSINESS 42 (1953).
CORDINGLY, supra note 36, at 31.
See PHILIP GOSSE, THE HISTORY OF PIRACY 156 (1932) (stating that Morgan

did not have his first command of a ship until 1666).
41.
Id.
42.
Id. at 157.
43.
Id.
44.
Id. at 159.
45.
Id. at 160.
46.

JAMES G. LYDON, PIRATES, PRIVATEERS, AND PROFITS 28-31 (1970).

47.
Id. at 29-30.
48.
See BLACKSTONE, supra note 3, at *71 (commenting that pirates are
enemies of all mankind, marking the different view England had of pirates in 1731);
LYDON, supra note 46, at 32-33.
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reasons that England and the world no longer viewed the pirate as a
49
patriot but as a plague.
The economic concerns seem to be highly relevant. The bullion
obtained by pirates like Drake was crucial during the time he roved
the sea because bullion was the base of the world's economy. But the
economic paradigm shifted from bullion to trade goods. 50 It would be
hard for trade to flourish if pirates regularly interfered with the trade
routes as the Romans discovered when piracy threatened Rome's
grain supply. While the courts placed great weight on the
heinousness of piracy in English piracy trials, the importance of trade
and economic considerations-notably the enrichment of Englandseem to have played important roles as well for punishing pirates.
The courts stated that, "Suffer pirates, and the commerce of the world
must cease." 51 The court also stated that if pirates are not punished,
piracy could lead to the "destruction of the innocent English in those
countries, the total loss of the Indian trade, and thereby the
impoverishment of this kingdom. '52 It seems that trade was an
important rationale for the harsh punishment of pirates. This is not
to say that Europe did not consider the heinousness of piracy as a
factor in the punishment of piracy. But the fact that Europe
encouraged piracy for such a long time prior to the beginning of the
eighteenth century would suggest it did not consider piracy
particularly heinous.
While England was trying to end piracy, privateering was openly
encouraged and regulated. But, before 1700, privateering was
synonymous with piracy. 53 Once England cracked down on piracy,
privateering became the preferred method of plunder on the high
seas. 54 The privateer carried a letter of marque from the crown that
authorized him to capture enemy ships. 55 The privateer and the
government would share the spoils.56 Of course, privateering was
piracy in which the state profited both economically and militarily
through the destruction of the enemy's supplies. Outside the issuance
of the letter of marque and the sharing of profits with the state, little
separated the pirate from the privateer in tactics. This also shows
that economics and not necessarily heinousness is the reason
England began to punish piracy. If the concern was that piracy was
extremely heinous, why have an official policy of allowing privateers

49.

LYDON, supra note 46, at 32-33.

50.
51.
52.

Id. at 30.
Rex v. Dawson, (1696) 13 Howell's State Trials 451, 453 (U.K.).
Id.

53.

LYDON, supra note 46, at 25; Rubin, supra note 27, at 17. Part of this

synonymy may have been that a number of pirates had letters of marques from one
country or another. LYNDON, supra note 46, at 25-26.
54.
LYDON, supra note 46, at 25-26.

55.
56.

Id.
Id.
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perform the same heinous acts the pirate performed? The answer is
that Europe did not view piracy as particularly heinous, but it was
economic consideration behind the decision to punish piracy.
C. Modern Piracy
As demonstrated by the recent attack on the Seabourn Spirit,
piracy is still a problem today. For the year 2003, the International
Maritime Bureau's Piracy Reporting Center in Kuala Lumpur had
452 pirate attacks or attempted attacks reported,5 7 122 of which
occurred in international water and would allow a state to exercise
universal jurisdiction. 58 In these attacks, pirates killed thirteen
people, injured forty-five, and caused fifty-four to go missing. The
pirates tossed eleven of those that went missing overboard, and they
were still missing at the time of the report. 59 In addition to this great
human toll, there was an economic toll as well: pirates hijacked
eleven ships reported as missing, set another ablaze, and ran a third
60
aground.
Apart from having greed as a motivating factor, modern pirates
and their eighteenth century counterparts have little in common.
Instead of sailing in tall ships, modern pirates tend to sail in smaller,
quicker boats such as canoes around Western Africa, 6 1 fast outboard
prahus in the Singapore area, 62 and sometimes in yachts that they
have hijacked at sea.6 3 Modern pirate groups are smaller as well,
usually consisting of twenty-five people or less. 64 The armament of
pirates has changed as well. Instead of fitting out with heavy cannons
and flintlock pistols, modern pirates are using "automatic rifles such
as the M-16 and AK-47[,] rocket launchers, grenade launchers, and
65
mortars."
Governments and politicians around the world have recognized,
to a greater or lesser extent, the problems that piracy poses. Maureen
Walker, Acting Deputy Director of the Office of Oceans Affairs in the

57.
Intl Mar. Org. [1MO], Reports on Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against
Ships, Annual Report-2003, at 1, T2-NAVSEC/2.7.1, Apr. 27, 2004, available at
http://www.imo.org/includes/blastDataOnly.asp/data id%3D9332/50-colour.pdf [hereinafter
2003 Piracy Report]. It is important to note that not all 452 of these attacks occurred outside
the territorial jurisdiction of every state. Many attacks occurred in port or within the
territorial water of a littoral state.
58.
Id. at Annex 2.
59.
Id. at 2.
60.
Id.
61.

CAPTAIN ROGER VILLAR, PIRACY TODAY, ROBBERY AND VIOLENCE AT SEA

SINCE 1980, at 16 (1985).
62.
Id. at 24.
63.
JACK A. GOTTSCHALK ET AL., JOLLY ROGER WITH AN UZI, THE RISE AND
THREAT OF MODERN PIRACY 47-48 (2000).
64.
VILLAR, supra note 61, at 16-17.
65.
GOTTSCHALK ET AL., supra note 63, at 121.
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U.S. State Department sent a letter to the United Nations
recognizing the dangers piracy posed.6 6 In a statement by Dr. Marie
Jacobsson, the EU recognized the growing problem of piracy and the
economic threat as well as the threat to human life it poses. 67 The
International Maritime Bureau's Piracy Reporting Center gives
weekly reports detailing recent attacks and warnings of where there
68
has been recent piratical activity.
Despite this awareness, the world's governments have done little
in terms of stopping piracy and bringing it to the world's attention. A
number of factors contribute to this. For the most part, piracy occurs
in areas other than the United States and other world powers. The
areas most prone to attack are "the South China Sea and the Malacca
Strait, South America and the Caribbean, the Indian Ocean, West
Africa, and East Africa. '6 9 In 2003, there was only one reported,
alleged attack in the United States. 70 As long as it does not
immediately affect the United States-or any other major country-it
is not surprising it is not a major issue in those countries.
There is also an economic reason. It is impossible to determine
precisely how much money is annually lost because of piracy due to
the nature of piracy, the fact that not all incidents of piracy are
reported, and because there is not a systematic method in place to
track financial loss. 7 1 This is not to say people have not made
estimates: based on a number of assumptions about estimated loss
and the number of incidents that went unreported, some have stated
that the estimated loss worldwide in 1995 might have been as high as
$62,200,000.72 While this is a lot of money, a conservative estimate
for the total amount of maritime commerce for the same year
amounts to over $2 trillion. 73 Thus, worldwide piracy losses accounted
for an "essentially negligible" 0.0029% of the overall world maritime

66.
Maureen O'C. Walker, Acting Deputy Director, Office of Oceans Affairs,
Piracy and Armed Robbery at Sea, U.S. Statement to the United Nations Open-ended
Informal Consultative Process on Oceans and Law of the Sea (Mar. 10, 2001)
(transcript available at http://www.state.gov/g/oes/rls/rm/4994.htm).
67.
Dr. Marie Jacobson, Alternate Head of Delegation of Sweden on behalf of
the European Union, Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery at Sea, Statement to the
First Committee (Disarmament and International Security) (transcript available at
http://europa-eu-un.org/articleslt/article 233jIt.htm).
68.
The International Maritime Bureau Piracy Reporting Centre, Weekly
Piracy Report, http://www.icc-ccs.org/prc/overview.php.
69.
2003 Piracy Report, supra note 57, at 1.
70.
Id. at Annex 1, p. 6; see also Int'l Mar. Org. [IMO], Reports on Acts of
Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships, Issued Monthly-Acts reported during April
2003, at Annex 1, p. 1, T1/13.01, May 7, 2003, available at http://www.imo.org/includes/
blastDataOnly.asp/data-ido3D7581/35.pdf.
71.

GOTTSCHALK ET AL., supra note 63, at 86.

72.
73.

Id. at 89-90.
Id. at 90.
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commerce, or 29.30 on every $10,000.74 With piracy accounting for
such a small amount of commerce, states might find that it is simply
not worth it economically to put in place a regime that will discourage
piracy.
D. Summation
Piracy has a long history and, unfortunately, a seemingly active
future. It has changed from a legitimate way of life to an outlaw
profession. The notion of who is a pirate has changed over time.
Piracy has been encouraged both expressly and implicitly in one
century and brutally punished in the next. Piracy is a heinous crime
worthy of punishment. It is important not to forget the human toll
piracy can take on society. But it is also apparent that it is not
necessarily this human toll, but the economic toll that caused piracy
to be punished heavily starting in the eighteenth century.
III. VIEWS ON JURISDICTION AND PIRACY

With a general background of piracy's history, this Note will now
turn to how the international legal community has dealt with piracy.
First, this Part will discuss the bases for a state's exercise of
jurisdiction over a person. Next, it will consider the views of scholars
on the subject of jurisdiction as it relates to pirates. Further, this Part
will discuss the needs and reasons scholars have given for allowing
states to exercise universal jurisdiction over pirates. Lastly, this Part
will discuss why those reasons no longer support an exception to the
generally accepted views of jurisdiction.
A. Bases of Jurisdiction
If a state wishes to prosecute someone, it must have jurisdiction
over the person. The state's relation to the actor or activity regulated
often provides the basis of this jurisdiction. The most common and
uncontroversial form of jurisdiction to prosecute is territorial
jurisdiction. 75 Territorial jurisdiction gives a state power to prescribe,
adjudicate, and enforce its laws as to those actors, activities, and things
that are found within its sovereign territory with few exceptions. 76 As
an example, the United States would have territorial jurisdiction over

74.
Id.
75.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 402(1), § 402(1) cmt. c (1987) ('The territorial principle is by far the most common
basis for the exercise of jurisdiction to prescribe, and it has generally been free from
controversy.").
76.
See id. at § 402 cmt. c.
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anyone that commits murder within the borders of the United States.
Not only would it make no sense for another country to prosecute the
murderer for the murder, but it also may lead to international
77
tension.
In some circumstances, a special form of jurisdiction called "flagstate" jurisdiction-a quasi-territorial form of jurisdiction-is
recognized. 78 The flag-state principle of jurisdiction states that a ship
is an extension of the territory of its flag state. 79 Put another way,
"the ship is to be treated as a floating island belonging to the flag
state." 80 This is a legal fiction, but it has good uses.8 1 Problems can
arise though as to who has jurisdiction over the ship when it is in the
territorial waters of a state other than its flag state.8 2 Almost all
form of jurisdiction as
governments recognize this as a legitimate
83
evidenced by its inclusion in the UNCLOS.
Under customary international law, a state may base jurisdiction
on factors other than territoriality. The "nationality" principle allows
a state to exercise jurisdiction over its citizens for their conduct
abroad.8 4 One of the reasons for this is that nationality is an essential
link to statehood. Another is that if a person willingly chooses to
remain a national of a state while traveling abroad and reaps the
benefits of that citizenship, he should also remain subject to the
jurisdiction of the state of which he is a citizen.8 5 This form of
jurisdiction has been most prevalent in the area of "private law"
regarding wills, divorce, etc.8 6 Jurisdiction based on nationality is a

77.
See id. at § 403 reporters' note 8 ("[Tlhe exercise of criminal jurisdiction in
relation to acts committed in another state may be perceived as particularly
intrusive.").
78.
The Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States
says that while this principle may be viewed as an extension of territorial jurisdiction,
it is best viewed as a wholly independent form of jurisdiction. Id. at § 402 cmt. h. The
Author believes that labeling it quasi-territorial makes clear that it is not to be viewed
as a strict form of the territorial principle, but that it does share a number of
similarities with territorial jurisdiction.
79.

HENKIN, supra note 3, at 234; see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN

RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 402 cmt. h ("[A] state may apply its law to
activities, persons, or things aboard a vessel, aircraft, or spacecraft registered in the
state.").
80.

81.

HENKIN, supra note 3, at 234.

Id.

82.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 502 cmt. d.
See UNCLOS, supra note 4, art. 94 ("Every state shall effectively exercise
83.
its jurisdiction and control in administrative, technical and social matters over ships
flying its flag.").
84.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 402(2); HENKIN, supra note 3, at 236-38.
HENKIN, supra note 3, at 236-37.
85.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
86.
§ 402 cmt. e.
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traditional exception to the exclusivity of territorial jurisdiction.8 7
Tension is possible if the state with territorial jurisdiction and the
state with nationality jurisdiction are not the same and both are
seeking to assert jurisdiction over an individual; however, there has
88
been little tension in practice.
While the nationality principle gives an individual's state of
citizenship the right to exercise jurisdiction over him, the passive
personality principle grants a state the authority to exercise
jurisdiction if one of its citizens is the victim of crime in a foreign
state.8 9 In general, scholars and governments have not viewed this
form of jurisdiction as favorably as they have the nationality form of
jurisdiction despite the link of citizenship. 90 France used this
principle when it sought to punish Pinochet for the forced
disappearance of French nationals living in Chile. 91
Another basis of jurisdiction is the "effects" principle. A state can
exercise jurisdiction over a foreign national who takes action in a
foreign state if that action affects the state seeking to assert
jurisdiction. 92 This is most commonly seen and least controversial in
the criminal practice where a shot from one country is aimed at and
lands in another country, which will then seek jurisdiction over the
shooter. The act took place in a foreign state by foreign nationals, but
the state that felt the effects of the act can exercise jurisdiction based
on the effects principle.9 3 One of the specialized categories within the
effects principle is the "protective" principle. 94 The protective
principle allows a state to exercise jurisdiction over foreign nationals

87.
considered
based on
traditional

Because this Note's focus is not on whether territorial jurisdiction is to be
exclusive and nationality jurisdiction an exception or whether jurisdiction
territory and nationality are both co-equal bases for jurisdiction, the
view of exclusivity will be used. But see HENKIN, supra note 3, at 237.

88.
89.

HENKIN, supra note 3, at 238.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED

STATES § 402 cmt g & reporters' note 3; see also HENKIN, supra note 3, at 239-40;
Kenneth C. Randall, Universal JurisdictionUnder InternationalLaw, 66 TEX. L. REV.
785, 787-88 (1988).

90.
See HENKIN, supra note 3, at 239 (stating that the interest of a foreigner
abroad has not been seen as "an essential element of statehood"); see also
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 402 cmt. g

("The [passive personality] principle has not been generally accepted for ordinary torts
or crimes.").
91.
Brigitte Stern, InternationalDecisions:French Tribunal de grande instance
(Paris),93 AM. J. INT'L L. 696, 696-99 (1999).
92.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§§ 402(3), 402 cmt. d; HENKIN, supra note 3, at 241-42.
93.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES

§ 402 cmt. d.
94.
See id. § 402 cmt. f ("[The] protective principle may be seen as a special
application of the effects principle, Comment d, but it has been treated as an
independent basis of jurisdiction."); cf. HENKIN, supra note 3, at 238 (explaining that
the effects principle and the protective principle are not the same).
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who commit acts in a foreign territory (or outside the territory of any
state) when those acts will affect a state's interests. 95 This has been
96
the most controversial of the traditional bases of jurisdiction.
The preceding forms of jurisdiction all contain some nexus
between the state wishing to assert jurisdiction and the actor. The
other basis of exercising jurisdiction recognized is the "universality"
principle, or universal jurisdiction. Universal jurisdiction allows for the
exercise of jurisdiction over certain actors or activities wherever they
occur without regard to nationality or territoriality. 97 Traditionally, the
concept of universal jurisdiction has been limited to piracy.9 8 On the
high seas or any place outside of the territory of any state, any state
has the right to seize any pirate ship and subject those on board to its
legal regime. 99 Thus, if a citizen of the United States aboard a ship
bearing a flag of the United States piratically attacks another ship
bearing the U.S. flag and carrying citizens and goods of the United
States in the middle of the Atlantic Ocean, any state can capture the
pirate ship and subject the pirate to the capturing state's laws. 10 0 It
can do this despite the fact that only the United States has any relation
to the actors, activities, and items involved. This is an example of
universal jurisdiction as applied to piracy.
B. Reasons for Applying Universal Jurisdictionto Piracy
A number of reasons have been put forth to explain why piracy is
subject to universal jurisdiction. For each reason, this Note will
discuss the rationale for applying universal jurisdiction and criticisms
of that rationale.

95.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§§ 402(3), 402 cmt. f; HENKIN, supra note 3, at 238-39.
96.
HENKIN, supra note 3, at 238-39.
97.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 404 cmt. a.
98.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES, § 34 cmt. b (1965) (citing piracy as the only crime subject to universal
jurisdiction); PRINCETON PROJECT ON UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION, THE PRINCETON
PRINCIPLES ON UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION 45 (2001)
[hereinafter PRINCETON
PRINCIPLES] (stating that piracy is "crucial to the origins of universal jurisdiction"); M.

Cherif Bassiouni, Universal Jurisdiction for International Crimes: Historical
Perspectives and Contemporary Practice, 42 VA. J. INT'L L. 81. 108 (2001) ("Piracy is
deemed the basis of universal criminal jurisdiction .... "); Randall, supra note 89, at
791 ("Piracy is the oldest offense that invokes Universal jurisdiction.").
99.
UNCLOS, supra note 4, art. 105; see also BLACKSTONE, supra note 3, at *71
(stating that every community has a right to self defense and can therefore inflict
punishment upon pirates who invade one's person or personal property); 18 U.S. (5
Wheat) app. 8 (1820) ("[Piracy] is an offense against all and every nation, and is
therefore alike punishable by all.").
100.
UNCLOS, supra note 4, art. 105.
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1. Statelessness
One of the reasons given for allowing states to exercise universal
jurisdiction over pirates is that by practicing piracy, the pirate and
his ship become denationalized. 011 If pirates are denationalized, then
any traditional form of jurisdiction predicated on the nationality of
the pirate will not apply. Further, if the ship itself is denationalized,
or loses its flag, no state could exercise jurisdiction over the pirate
through the flag-state principle.
Since piracy occurs on the high seas, the territoriality principle is
difficult to apply. Since the early seventeenth century, all
governments have recognized the concept of mare liberum.10 2 In 1609,
Hugo Grotius developed the concept of mare liberum, which is the
idea that the seas can belong to no country and are entirely free to
trade and travel.10 3 Therefore, ships, while floating on the high
seas, 10 4 float not within the territorial jurisdiction of any state, but
outside the jurisdiction of every state. Thus, the traditional territorial
form of jurisdiction does not apply since the ships float in neutral
waters while on the high seas. Thus, states could only exercise
jurisdiction over pirates through a traditional form of jurisdiction by
using the passive personality principle or the protective principle, two
somewhat controversial forms of jurisdiction.
The problem with this analysis is that it assumes that by
cruising piratically, the ship and its crew are stripped of their
nationality. This is a complete legal fiction that has been largely
eliminated.' 0 5 The UNCLOS now discredits the notion that it is a
universal rule that pirates and their ships lose their national
character. Instead, it leaves it up to each state to decide whether its
ships lose their national character if they practice piracy.' 0 6 During
the twentieth century, and even before, many states declared that its
10 7
ships did not lose their national character by cruising as pirates.
Thus, the only stateless ships would be those whose flag state denied

101.
Joseph W. Bingham, Part IY-Piracy, RES. INT'L L., 739, 825, 831 (1932)
('The pirate has in fact no national character."); Randall, supra note 89, at 793; see also
BLACKSTONE, supra note 3, at *71 (noting that pirates had renounced society and its
benefits and returned to "the savage state of nature" which suggests they lose any
national identity or the protections that go with it).
102.
See HUGO GROTIUS, DE JURE BELLI Ac PACIS LIBRI TRES 190 (Francis W.
Kelsey trans. 1925) (1646) (stating that the sea "both as a whole and in its principle
divisions cannot become subject to private ownership.").
103.
UNCLOS, supra note 4, art. 89 ("No State may validly purport to subject
any part of the high seas to its sovereignty.").
104.
See id., art. 86 (explaining what constitutes the high seas).
105.
Bingham, supra note 101, at 825.
106.
UNCLOS, supra note 4, art. 104.
107.
See Bingham, supra note 101, at 826 ("[T]here can be little doubt that the
law of nations would today accord a protecting authority over him and his interests to
the state of his nationality.").
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nationality based on cruising piratically or those ships that flew more
than one flag.10 8
Even if the ship itself were stateless, however, there is nothing to
suggest that the pirate himself loses his national character. When
referring to pirates, many courts refer to the nationality of the pirate,
which would suggest that nationality still matters.10 9 What is so
special about piracy that one loses his nationality by practicing it?
Surely mass murderers like Ted Bundy never lost their nationality,
despite the fact that they committed truly heinous acts. Why should
the pirate lose his nationality? It no longer makes sense to consider
pirates as stateless, and thus, a state can always exercise a less
controversial form of jurisdiction based on territoriality or
nationality.
2. Pirates are Hostis Humani Generis
One of the more frequently cited rationales for subjecting piracy
to universal jurisdiction is the notion that pirates are hostis humani
generis--enemies of all mankind. 110 The reasoning is that because
pirates indiscriminately attack ships on the high seas, they are
waging war on all countries. They are the enemies of all of mankind.
Therefore, any country can capture and punish a pirate.'1 1 But, as
this Part will show, this argument is questionable at best.
Part of the appeal of this argument comes from the phrase hostis
humani generis itself. Because it is a Latin phrase, it instantly
suggests that it is a phrase of ancient origin, or has been around at
least several centuries. Thus, if pirates have always been considered
the enemies of all mankind, why should it be any different today. But,
is the phrase really of ancient origin?
The Romans did not use the phrase hostis humani generis. The
phrase may be a shortening of a phrase used by Cicero. He claimed
that pirates were the common enemies of all communities. 1 12 But the
pirates that Cicero was referring to were not the same as the pirates
of the seventeenth century and today. As noted above, the Romans
used their word for pirate to describe a community who, without
formally declaring war before attacking, practiced what would today

108.
109.
defendants
110.
before him
115.
111.
112.
omnium").

UNCLOS, supra note 4, art. 92.
See Rex v. Dawson, (1696) 13 Howell's State Trials 451, 453 (noting that
had practiced their crimes "upon their own countrymen, the English... ").
Coke, in 1638, seems to be the first to apply the phrase to piracy. Others
seem to have hinted that they may be hostis humani generis. See infra note
BLACKSTONE, supra note 3, at *71.
See M. TULLI CICERONIS, DE OFFIC|IS III. 107 ("sed communis hostis
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be considered piracy or land-based banditry. 13 Cicero was not
necessarily talking about pirates like Edward Teach.
This is not to say that the Romans may not have considered
pirates the enemies of all mankind. It only says that they never used
the phrase hostis humani generis to describe pirates. When the
Romans thought of piracy, they may have considered the pirates to be
"enemies of all mankind" because they never declared war before they
attacked. 114 As shown earlier, this failure to declare war formally
before attacking is why the Romans felt the pirate communities were
in a constant and permanent state of war.
From this, it is clear that the concept of hostis humani generis
cannot be said to be of Roman origin. Further, the Romans, while
they may have considered pirates the enemies of all mankind, were
not thinking necessarily of pirates like Blackbeard but of
communities whose way of life conflicted with the Roman way of life.
They were also thinking of people who plundered on both land and
sea.
In 1612, Gentili wrote about the problem of piracy and how
states may deal with pirates. He did not use the phrase hostis
humani generis to describe pirates, but he did speak of pirates as the
''common enemies of all mankind" using language similar to
Cicero. 115 Unlike Cicero and the Romans, Gentili felt that a state of
war could not exist with pirates and brigands because, even though
they may act as pirates, individuals are still the citizens of a state. As
citizens, they are still subject to the laws of their state of
citizenship. 116 Therefore, pirates do not come under the laws of war
and states need not treat pirates in accord with the laws of war
because only sovereigns fall under the laws of war. 117 By engaging in
18
piracy, pirates do not free themselves from the law of their country.'
Another reason the laws of war do not apply to pirates is that the
laws of war are "derived from the law of nations, and malefactors do
not enjoy the privileges of a law to which they are foes." 119 He states
that "[w]ith pirates and brigands, who violate all laws, no laws
remain in force.' 120 Because they are everyone's enemies, pirates do

113.
114.

See supra Part II.A.
Rubin, supra note 27, at 83.

115.

ALBERTO GENTILI, 1 DE JURE BELLI LIBRI TRES *33 [35] ("Pirate omnium

mortaliai hoftes funt communes."). It is interesting that the English translation does
use the phrase "enemies of all mankind" in describing pirates. A look at the Latin
original shows he did not use the phrase hostis humani generis.
116.
Id. at *34 [36]. This is different than the Roman view which viewed pirates
as in a constant state of war.
117.
Id. at *34-35 [36-37].
118.
Id.
119.
Id. at *35 [37].
120.
Id. at *38 [40].
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not get the benefit of any law. 121 Therefore, it seems states can do
with pirates what they wish. Part of the difference in view between
Gentili and the Romans as to whether pirates could wage war may be
due to the fact that they were referring to different people and
concepts when they discussed pirates. Yet, his argument for his
treatment of pirates derives ancient authority from Cicero, despite
the fact he and Cicero were talking about different concepts and
people.
England did not initially share Gentili's view that pirates were
the common enemy of mankind and anyone had the right to seize
them. Lord Coke was the first to use the phrase hostis humani
generis to describe pirates. 122 Originally, according to Lord Coke,
piracy was a form of treason. Coke does not cite to another source for
this phrase, though his use of the Latin phrase in an English text
suggests that he was borrowing it from some older source with some
speculating that it was from Cicero. 123 This would be a shortening of
the passage by Cicero mentioned above. 124 Coke declared that piracy
125
was a form of treason because pirates were hostis humani generis.
Unfortunately, he does not explain why the pirates are hostis humani
generis or why this makes piracy treason.
If an English admiralty court was to try a pirate, there had to be
English citizens or ships involved or the pirate himself had to be
English because piracy was a form of treason. 126 This seems to align
itself with the views of Gentili in that pirates were still subject to the
jurisdiction of a state. 127 This also suggests that pirates were not
subject to universal jurisdiction because the English admiralty courts
required a link to England before they could punish pirates.
Within a century, England would replace the view of piracy as a
form of treason, limited to instances where there was a connection to
England, with something similar to universal jurisdiction. In 1696,
the jury in Rex v. Dawson was instructed that:
The King of England hath not only an empire and sovereignty over the
British seas, but also an undoubted jurisdiction and power . . . for the
punishment of all piracies and robberies at seas, in the most remote

Id. at *36 [38].
121.
SIR EDWARD COKE, THE THIRD PART ON THE INSTITUTES ON THE LAWS OF
122.
ENGLAND *113 (1797).

123.

See Rubin, supra note 27, at 55 n.61. This would make sense based on the

work of Gentili, who referred to the Cicero passage. See also GENTILI, supra note 115,

at 35.
124.

See CICERONIS,

supra note

112,

at 111.107

("Nam pirata non est ex

perdeuellum numero definitus, sed communis hostis omnium: cum hoc nec fides nec jus
jurandum esse commune.").
125.
See COKE, supra note 122, at *113.

126.

Rubin, supra note 27, at 47.

127.

See GENTILI, supra note

115.

Interestingly,

this

also undercuts

argument that pirates become stateless because they practice piracy.

the

992

VANDERBIL TJOURNAL OF TRANSNA TIONAL LAW

[VOL. 39.:973

part of the world; so that if any person whatsoever, native or
foreign.., with whose country we have no war . . . and are in amity
shall be robbed or spoiled [on the high seas], it is piracy within the
128
limits of your enquiry, and the cognizance of this court.

From this, it seems that the courts were no longer constrained in
whom they could punish as pirates.
Blackstone, in his Commentaries on the Laws of England,
declared that piracy is a crime "against the universal law of
society."'1 29 He then declared that pirates are hostis humani generis,
and cites to Coke. 130 While he may have cited to Coke for the phrase
hostis humani generis, he did not agree with Coke that piracy was a
form of treason. Instead, according to Blackstone, because a pirate
was hostis humani generis, the pirate had
renounced all the benefits of society and government, and has reduced
himself afresh to the savage state of nature, by declaring war against
all mankind, all mankind must declare war against him: so that every
community hath a right, by the rule of self-defence, to inflict that
punishment upon him, which every individual would in a state of
nature have been otherwise entitled to do, any invasion of his person or
13 1
personal property.

This view of piracy seems to follow that of Gentili in that every
individual has a right to punish pirates wherever they are found
because they are the enemies of all mankind and they no longer enjoy
the privileges of law. 132 Contrary to Gentili's view that the pirate did
not lose his citizenship, however, the Blackstonian pirate, by
engaging in unlawful pursuits, is stripped of his nationality.
Robert Walton, writing in 1693 had a different conception of to
whom the phrase should be applied and arguably may have been
making the most apt analogy. To Walton, pirates were a limited set of
people who "commit[ ] acts of hostility against all men without
distinction.' 133 This would be in line with the Roman tradition
because those who were considered pirates were said to be at war
with all who were around them. 134 Walton's reasoning seems to
suggest that Vikings, the Barbary states, and Malayan nobles should
also be considered pirates. 13 5 England though recognized the

128.
Rex v. Dawson, (1696) 13 Howell's State Trials 451, 455 (U.K.) (emphasis
added).
129.
BLACKSTONE, supra note 3, at *71.
130.
Id.
131.
Id.
132.
See supra text accompanying notes 115-21.
133.
DOCUMENTS RELATING TO LAW AND CUSTOM OF THE SEA 147 (R.G. Marsden
ed., 1915).
134.
See Eugene Kontorovich, The Piracy Analogy: Modern Universal
Jurisdiction'sHollow Foundation,45 HARV. INT'L L.J. 183, 234 (2004).
135.
Rubin, supra note 27, at 84.
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sovereignty of the Barbary States and did not consider their actions
136
to be piracy.
This all shows that even if the writers of the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries were using a phrase of Roman origin, they were
not using it in the manner in which the Romans would have thought
of it or applying it to the same concept or peoples the Romans would
have. Even amongst themselves, they could not come up with a
consistent use or definition of the phrase. It would seem that the
word "pirate," if it is to be used in the historical way the Romans
would have used it, would be fitting for those from the Barbary
states: states that were formed for reasons other than piracy but
practiced what is commonly considered piracy. But these states were
not considered pirate nations. 13 7 In fact, by this time, the word
"pirate" and the phrase hostis humani generis were used to describe
138
It
outlaws, something that neither had ever been used to describe.
would seem odd to claim that the use of the phrase hostis humani
generis provides a historical link between piracy in Roman times and
139
piracy in the seventeenth century.
The phrase hostis humani generis is still used to describe pirates
today. But instead of being considered hostis humani generis because
of all of the reasons given so far, they are now considered hostis
humani generis because of piracy's heinousness. Professor Randall
has stated that part of the reason pirates are considered hostis
humani generis is because of the heinousness of their crime. 140 The
number of groups or people considered hostis humani generis has also
expanded. Professor Randall states that "[t]hose who commit
hijacking, hostage taking, crimes against internationally protected
''141
persons, apartheid, and torture are today's hostis humani generis.
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals in the United States has stated
that "the torturer has become like the pirate and slave trader before
him hostis humani generis, an enemy of all mankind."142 This is again
based on the heinousness of each of these crimes.
So why are pirates labeled hostis humani generis? Literally, it
translates from Latin to English as "common enemies of all
mankind. i1 43 In Roman times, this may have been true because the
concept was applied to communities that were constantly at war with
everyone around them-literally enemies of all mankind. 144 But, to

136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

Id. at 49, 68.
Id. at 68, 83-84
Id. at 83-84.
Id. at 84.
Randall, supra note 89, at 794.
Id. at 832.
Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 890 (2d Cir. 1980) (emphasis added).
Rubin, supra note 27, at 11.
Kontorovich, supra note 134, at 234.
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say that pirates of the seventeenth century and today are enemies of
all mankind is nothing more than an "embellishment.' 1 45 The U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of New York stated that "it is
doubtful whether any pirates ever really practiced or intended to
146
It
practice, wholly indiscriminate robbery upon all vessels alike."'
would seem that pirates do not fall within the literal meaning of the
phrase as would have been understood by the Romans.
Outside of the literal translation of the phrase, a consistent
definition is fleeting. The Romans would have applied it to
communities that did not declare war before attacking or to the
communities of the eastern Mediterranean with whom they felt they
were in perpetual war because they attacked ships without first
declaring war. Blackstone and others of the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries would apply it to individuals because they
attacked "indiscriminately" against the laws of all nations. Today, the
phrase applies not just to piracy but a litany of crimes where the only
common link seems to be heinousness. 14 7 To claim that because
pirates are hostis humani generis, and therefore subject to universal
jurisdiction because it has been that way since Ancient Rome in no
way comports with history. The phrase has been applied to different
people and concepts for differing purposes for the past two-thousand
years with the only true constant being the words of the phrase itself
for the past four-hundred years.
This analysis seems to lead to one question: "Is the jurisdiction
[over piracy] universal because [pirates] are hostes humani generis, or
are they said to be hostes humani generis because the jurisdiction is
universal?"'148 It has been shown that to be found guilty of piracy and
have universal jurisdiction apply, a pirate does not need to be truly
the enemy of all mankind. There have been pirates convicted after
committing only one attack, without proof that they were enemies of
all countries. 149 It would seem therefore that pirates are hostis
humani generis not because of their actions, but because the major
naval powers have traditionally exercised universal jurisdiction over
them. They called the pirate hostis humani generis for rhetorical
purposes, as a "metaphorical invective. '150 Thus, to say that because
pirates are hostis humani generis and therefore subject to universal
jurisdiction is circular. The only rational reason to label them hostis
humani generis in most cases is because they are subject to universal
jurisdiction. Yet, they are subject to universal jurisdiction in part

145.
146.
147.
148.
351 (1924).
149.
150.

The Ambrose Light, 25 F. 408, 423 (S.D.N.Y. 1885).
Id.
Kontorovich, supra note 134, at 237.
Edwin D. Dickinson, Is the Crime of Piracy Obsolete?, 38 HARV. L. REV. 334,
See id. at 351-55.
Id. at 359.
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because pirates and slavers and other are considered hostis humani
generis. The labeling of pirates as hostis humani generis is neither
accurate nor can it provide a good reason to apply universal
jurisdiction to piracy.
3. Heinousness
One of the reasons for subjecting pirates to universal jurisdiction
today has been the heinousness of piracy.1 51 As Professor Kontorovich
has implied, this may be a case of the tail wagging the dog or reverse
engineering.152 Because society felt that truly heinous crimes such as
genocide and torture should be subject to universal jurisdiction,
society started looking for analogous crimes whose perpetrators were
subject to universal jurisdiction. Piracy was first on the list. But the
only common link (outside the use of the phrase hostis humani
generis to describe the perpetrators) would appear to be
heinousness. 153 Therefore, piracy must have been subject to universal
jurisdiction due to its heinousness. 154 The Princeton Principles lists
piracy as a crime subject to universal jurisdiction amongst other
crimes, where all are subject to universal jurisdiction due to their
heinousness. 155 But is piracy so heinous that it should be subject to
universal jurisdiction?
It is obvious that pirates and piracy can be heinous. There are
accounts such as Exquemelin's and Captain Johnson's that go into
great detail in describing the atrocities pirates committed long ago,
though one may question the validity of some of their claims. 15 6 More
recently, pirates murdered the entire twenty-seven-member crew of
the Cheung Sun in 1998; only six of the bodies were found. 157 China
executed the pirates that committed these murders in 2000.158

151.
OSCAR SCHACHTER, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 270
(1991); PRINCETON PRINCIPLES, supra note 98, at 23-24.

152.

See Kontorovich, supra note 134, at 236-37.

153.
154.

Id. at 236
See generally id. at 236-37 (giving the impression that the expansion of

universal jurisdiction is what has caused piracy to be considered particularly heinous
and not that piracy is of such acute heinousness to allow for universal jurisdiction.
Instead, modern theorists of universal jurisdiction, looking for a link to the past,
reclassified piracy as heinous to meet their ends.).
155.
PRINCETON PRINCIPLES, supra note 98, at 28-29.
156.
For example, Exquemelin was successfully sued by Henry Morgan for libel
because his writing, at least parts of it, were found to be untrue. See ALEXANDER 0.
ExQUEMELIN,

THE

HISTORY

OF THE

BUCANIERS

OF

AMERICA

(printed

for Tho.

Newborough 1699), available at http://www.eebo.chadwyck.org. One must also read A
General History by Johnson with skepticism.
157.
10 Charged on PiracyKillings, HONG KONG STANDARD, Feb. 5, 1999.
158.
Jack Hitt, Bandits in the Global Shipping Lanes, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Aug.
20, 2000, 68-69.
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Traditionally though, heinousness is not the underlying
rationale for punishing piracy. While early English piracy cases
discussed heinousness, it seems that it was mostly for rhetorical
purposes. As explained above, one of the primary concerns for the
English was not the heinousness of piracy, but the negative effects it
had on trade. "Piracy is the worst sort of robbery, both in its nature
and its effect, since it disturbs the commerce and friendship betwixt
different nations."'159 Other examples of the primacy of economic
concerns have been given above.160 In fact, early English cases felt
piracy was terrible not because it hurt individuals, but because it
hurt the state itself. 16 1 If the concern over piracy and rationale for
allowing universal jurisdiction 162 was heinousness, it seems odd that
the admiralty courts would focus not on the human toll, but on the
international relations of the state and the economic impact piracy
posed.
Additionally, many other crimes and acts are considered
heinous. 163 Therefore, for the degree of heinousness to be the
motivation for subjecting pirates to universal jurisdiction, it would
presumably have to be the most heinous of crimes to warrant such a
radical departure from traditional norms. 164 But piracy is not that
heinous. 165 For the U.S. Supreme Court, "[n]o crime is greater than
treason."' 6 6 Murder, rape, and kidnapping amongst others are
undoubtedly extremely heinous in nature. 167 Again, while piracy can
be very heinous, so are murder and other crimes. Yet, they are not
subject to universal jurisdiction. Canada cannot prosecute one
American for the murder of another American that took place within
the United States. Yet, the killing of another human being is one of
the most heinous crimes is it not? Is robbery on the ocean as heinous
as cold-blooded murder? If heinousness is the basis of universal
jurisdiction, why are murder and other heinous crimes not subject to
universal jurisdiction?
Heinousness is of course a very subjective term and reasonable
people may disagree on which crimes are more heinous than others.

159.
Rex v. Dawson, (1696) 13 Howell's State Trials 451, 482 (U.K.) (emphasis
added).
160.
See supranotes 50-52 and accompanying text.
161.
Rex v. Dawson, (1696) 13 Howell's State Trials 451, 453 (U.K.).
162.
It must be remembered that while Rex v. Dawson stated that it is
undoubted that England had the power to punish piracy wherever it existed, this was
nothing but dicta. See supra note 128. The case actually involved all English citizens,
so it was not necessary to exercise universal jurisdiction.
163.
Kontorovich, supranote 134, at 233.
164.
Id.
165.
See id. at 233-35.
166.
Hanauer v. Doane, 79 U.S. 342, 347 (1871).
167.
See Kontorovich, supra note 134, at 234 (listing crimes where the courts
have applied the word "heinous" to the crime).
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An objective way to determine the heinousness of a crime is to look at
how a state punishes the crime. 168 The United States punishes piracy
under the law of nations with life in prison. 169 The United States
punishes murder with death in some instances. 7 0 The United States
can punish treason with death. 171 Death is certainly a harsher
penalty than life in prison, which suggests those crimes punishable
by death are more heinous than those crimes that are only punished
with life in prison.
The fact that piracy is not the crime with the harshest
punishment is not unique to America. In Russia, piracy is punished
with a prison sentence of five to ten years if there are no weapons
involved, eight to twelve years if a weapon is involved, and ten to
fifteen years if an organized group commits it or death results from
it.17 2 For some homicides, Russia uses the punishment of the death
penalty or life imprisonment. 173 In Mexico, the punishment is
imprisonment for fifteen to thirty years. 1 74 Argentina, on the other
hand, punishes piracy with imprisonment for three to fifteen years, or
fifteen to twenty-five years if death occurs during the commission of
the piracy. 175 These are but a few examples, but they show that not
everyone views piracy to be equally heinous. Most do not even view
piracy as the most heinous crime. To base universal jurisdiction on
heinousness alone then seems misguided.
4. Uniform Punishment
One of the rationales Professor Kontorovich provides for the
historical application of universal jurisdiction to piracy is that piracy
was punished equally everywhere. 17 6 At one point, determining the
punishment for piracy was easy: regardless of which country was
7
about to impose punishment, the punishment was always death.1
As Professor Kontorovich points out, this uniformity was important in
allowing piracy to be subject to universal jurisdiction. It prevented
forum shopping. And a country whose interests a pirate had hurt

168.

Jonathan Turley, Reflections on Murder, Misdemeanors, and Madison, 28

HOFSTRA L. REV. 439, 458 (1999).

169.

18 U.S.C. § 1651 (2004).

170.
171.

§ 1111.
§ 2381.

172.
CRIMINAL CODE OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION 178-79 (William E. Butler
trans., 2004).
173.
Id. at 66-67.
174.
Codigo Penal Federal [C.P.F.] [Federal Criminal Code], arts. 146-47, 14 de
Agosto de 1931 (Mex.).
175.
COD. PEN. arts. 198-99 (Arg.).
176.
Eugene Kontorovich, Implementing Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain: What Piracy
Reveals About the Limits of the Alien Tort Statute, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 111, 142-45
(2004).

177.

Id. at 142.
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would know that, no matter which country caught the pirate, his
punishment would be death. 178 This eliminated concerns of over or
179
under punishment and prevented international tensions.
While that may have been the case during the eighteenth
century, such uniform punishment is no longer a reality. In 1897, the
United States changed the punishment of piracy from the death
penalty to life in prison. 180 The Congressman who introduced the bill
stated that the purpose was, in part, to allow juries to find people
guilty of certain crimes, including piracy; juries were refusing to
convict people because they knew they would receive the death
penalty. 18 1 While some felt that the bill should have done away with
capital punishment altogether, it seemed clear that the peoples'
representatives felt that crimes such as rape and murder were
heinous enough to deserve the death penalty. 18 2 There was a failed
amendment to the bill that would have allowed piracy to be punished
18 3
by either death or life in prison that was voted down.
Representative Barrett, who proposed the amendment, felt that
piracy was as evil as murder if not worse, 18 4 but the rest of the House
did not agree. 18 5 This shows that the United States did not view
piracy as such a heinous crime.
In 1901, the commission in whom Congress had entrusted the
task of revising and codifying the penal laws of the United States
remarked that nearly all other countries punished piracy with death
and that it was of "questionable expedience that United States should
constitute an exception.' 8 6 By the time of the Harvard draft
international agreement in 1935, more countries had moved away
18 7
from the death penalty as the punishment of piracy.
Part of the problem is that the definition of piracy does not
include a penalty for piracy. If a penalty was included, then arguably
the exercise of universal jurisdiction would not be as objectionable
because, as in days gone by, the pirate would be punished the same
way regardless of where he is tried. Such is not the case, however, as
the definition includes no penalty to be applied uniformly.

178.
179.
180.

Id.
Id.
Act of January 15, 1987, 29 Stat. 487, 487-89.

181.

See 28 CONG. REC. 3098-99 (1896).

182.
183.
184.
185.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 3099.
at 3111.
at 3110.
at 3111.

186.
ALEX C. BOTKIN ET AL., PENAL CODE OF THE UNITED STATES: REPORT OF
THE COMMISSION TO REVISE AND CODIFY THE CRIMINAL AND PENAL LAWS OF THE
UNITED STATES XXVII (1901).

187.

Bingham, supra note 101, at 893-1013.
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As shown above, different countries punish piracy in different
ways, ranging from three years in prison 8 8 to death. 18 9 Therefore,
the uniformity of punishment, if it ever did justify universal
jurisdiction, no longer does. In fact, this difference may cause the very
tensions and concerns about over/under punishment that Professor
Kontorovich warned about.1 90
5. Narrowly-Defined Offense
Another reason given for traditionally allowing states to exercise
universal jurisdiction over piracy is that it was a narrowly defined
offense. 19 1 There existed, so the argument goes, a simple definition of
piracy that all nations agreed upon and that all nations could easily
apply. This seems to have been important in that it helped to prevent
states from "exercise[ing universal jurisdiction] opportunistically for
political ends."'1 9 2 It was also important that all nations agreed on a
single definition of piracy, which remained stable for hundreds of
years. 193 While there is some dispute over whether there ever existed
a uniform definition of piracy in the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries, this Note will assume that there may have been a single
194
definition at one time.
But even assuming that there was a single, uniform definition at
one point, the question becomes whether there is a single, uniform
definition now. In developing the Harvard Research Draft Convention
for the Law of Piracy (from which a majority of the definition of
piracy for the UNCLOS was derived), the reporters flatly stated,
"[t]here is no authoritative definition."' 19 5 This view may seem to be
undercut by the fact that there is a single definition of piracy in the
UNCLOS, which most countries have signed. 196 There was much
debate, however, as to whether the definition made sense and
whether or not it adequately and accurately codified piracy.' 9 7 In
addition to Professor Rubin, others also criticize the current
1 98
definition found in the treaty.

188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.

COD. PEN. arts. 198-99 (Arg.).
Hitt, supra note 158, at 68-69.
Kontorovich, supranote 176, at 142.
See id. at 139-42.
Id. at 139.
Id. at 140.

194.

Id. at 141-42.

195.
Bingham, supra note 101, at 795.
196.
UNCLOS, supra note 4, art. 101.
197.
See Rubin, supra note 27, at 319-37.
198.
See Phillip A. Buhler, New Struggle with an Old Menace: Towards a
Revised Definition of Maritime Piracy, 8 CURRENTS: INT'L TRADE L.J. 61 (Winter 1999)
(detailing complaints with the current definition of piracy).
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There are gaps in the current definition of piracy that undermine
the existence of a uniform definition. Are rebels that are attacking
the vessels of the state against which they rebel committing acts of
piracy if they attack on the high seas? 199 If a citizen of country A,
while on a cruise in international waters on board a ship flying the
flag of country A, robs another citizen of country A, does this fall
under the definition of piracy found in the UNCLOS? Should it? What
about a group hijacking a ship as a form of protest? Should this
constitute piracy or was the hijacking not for private ends? 20 0 What
exactly constitutes a "private end" for purposes of the definition in
UNCLOS? 20 1 Are two ships a requirement (ship A attacking ship B)
or can one ship commit piracy (mutiny)?20 2 These are just some of the
areas where individual states must interpret the treaty to define
piracy. Each area is subject to several differing, but plausible
interpretations, thus allowing for numerous variations as to what
constitutes piracy depending on which state is doing the interpreting.
Because the international political and legal system is
horizontal, there is no single court that can bring order to these
various interpretations. Instead, each country can maintain its
interpretation, even if it is at odds with every other country. Thus, to
claim that there is a common definition may be correct in the sense
that there is a definition of piracy in the UNCLOS, but the
interpretation of that definition can potentially vary greatly between
states. Differing interpretations have the potential to lead to state A
considering an individual act piracy and state B not considering that
same act piracy.
Professor Rubin puts forth an even stronger argument against
the presence of a uniform definition of piracy. According to Rubin, the
current definition and rules regulating piracy are "incomprehensible
and therefore codify nothing. '20 3 Thus, while the presence of a
uniform definition may have at one time justified the use of universal
jurisdiction, there is no longer any uniform definition to justify its
application today.

199.
Samuel Pyeatt Menefee, The Case of the Castle John, or Greenbeard the
Pirate?:Environmentalism, Piracy and the Development of InternationalLaw, 24 CAL.
W. INT'L L.J. 1, 4 (1993) (discussing Burley's Case during the U.S. Civil War).
200.
See id. (discussing this topic in general).
201.
See Samuel Pyeatt, The "New JamaicanDiscipline" Problems with Piracy,
Maritime Terrorism, and the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea, 6 CONN. J. INT'L
L. 127, 142-43 (1990).
202.
See id. at 144. This controversy has been referred to in different settings as
the "internal seizure issue" or the "one ship/two ships controversy." See Menefee, supra
note 199, at 5.
203.
Rubin, supra note 27, at 344. For his explanation of the problems with the
current rules defined in UNCLOS, see id. at 319-37.
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6. Piracy Directly Threatens or Harms Many Nations
Professor Kontorovich points out that because piracy directly
threatens and has the potential to harm many, if not all nations, it is
legitimate to subject piracy to universal jurisdiction.2 0 4 While some
pirates did focus solely on the ships of particular countries for various
reasons, some simply preyed on any ship they saw, without regard to
which state's flag the victim's ship was flying. 20 5 Therefore, some
pirates did pose a threat to every nation that sent ships out on the
seas. Allowing universal jurisdiction over piracy can be seen as a sort
of "national 'self-defence."' 20 6 Pirates today also act similarly in that
they may attack either the ships of particular states or whatever ship
happens their way.
Is the potential that a pirate may attack any ship that happens
its way a sufficient reason to create an exception to traditional
principles of jurisdiction? If a U.S. citizen murdered a fellow citizen
near the Canadian border (but still in the United States) and then
fled into Canada, would Canada have the right to prosecute the
American because he may potentially harm Canadian citizens?
Canada could capture him and extradite him, but they could not
legitimately punish him. Suppose a U.S. citizen went on a bank
robbing spree starting in Canada, went south through the United
States, then headed further south through Mexico, robbing banks all
the way. When he enters Belize, could Belize prosecute him for the
bank robberies in the other countries on the theory that the robber
poses a potential threat to Belize since he has a pattern of robbing
banks and moving towards Belize? No.
Yet, pirates have been convicted after having committed only one
piratical attack, without a showing that they had the intent to
deprave every state. 20 7 Is this different from the bank robber moving
south? There is a very good chance the bank robber is going to start
robbing banks in Belize. Yet, Belize is not allowed to prosecute him
for his crimes committed against other countries. The potential of
injuring any country cannot be a sufficient reason to allow every
country to punish the pirate. There is no logical reason not to extend
it to the bank-robbing situation. Thus, this is not a sufficient reason
to allow pirates to be subject to universal jurisdiction.

204.
205.
206.
207.

Kontorovich, supra note 176, at 152-53.
Id. at 153.
Id.
Dickinson, supra note 148, at 352.
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7. Summation
The most troubling aspect of the rationales given for piracy being
subject to universal jurisdiction is that they can be applied to
numerous crimes. The robbery example above illustrates a prime
example. Robbery is almost universally condemned. Robbery, like
piracy, is universally seen as a heinous crime. It has a differing
definition between states, similar to the way different states may
interpret the definition of piracy differently. Also, robbery and piracy
are both dependent on the prosecuting state for the penalties that
will be imposed on the convicted defendant. A serial robber often
poses harm to any state in which he is found, even if he has not yet
robbed a bank in that state.
The only real difference seems to be the site of the crime itself.
Piracy takes place on the high seas outside the jurisdiction of every
state, while robbery takes place in the territory of a single state. Yet,
if one ascribes to flag state jurisdiction, the differences disappear.
This is because under the flag-state principle, the attacks are
committed on board a ship that flies the flag of some country, and the
crime can thereby be considered to have been committed within the
jurisdiction of the flag state. 208 It is only in the rare case that piracy
is committed and no state has at least a quasi-territorial claim of
jurisdiction. In those situations, there is always the nationality
principle on which to hang jurisdiction, which is less problematic
than universal jurisdiction.
There is nothing that suggests that there is still a need to apply
universal jurisdiction to piracy, as all of the old reasons for doing so
no longer apply. The only reason remaining for continuing to do so,
which is alluded to above, is simply because that is how piracy has
been handled for hundreds of years. Given the long history of using
universal jurisdiction in this way, why should it be changed, even if it
is no longer need it?
IV. WHY UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION AS APPLIED TO PIRACY SHOULD BE
ELIMINATED

Arguably, there are no good reasons for applying universal
jurisdiction to pirates. This fact, however, may not be compelling
enough to upset this system, which has been in place for hundreds of
years. Unless there are considerations that counsel against the

208.
Samuel E. Lojan, The ProliferationSecurity Initiative:Navigating the Legal
Challenges, 14 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POLY 253, 267-68 (2005). This is assuming the ship
is on the high seas and outside the jurisdiction of any one state. When the ship is
within the territorial waters of a state other than its flag state, different issues arise
that are beyond the scope of this Note.
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application of universal jurisdiction to pirates, perhaps the current
system should be kept in place.
Unfortunately, there are a number of reasons to do away with
universal jurisdiction. First, universal jurisdiction is a very powerful
tool, which, wielded unwisely, is likely to create unduly tense
international relations. More importantly, the application of
universal jurisdiction, at least as applied to piracy, violates notions of
due process.
A. Potentialto Cause InternationalTension
Part of the problem with universal jurisdiction, regardless of its
application to the pirate, the slaver, the war criminal, or the torturer,
is its potential to cause international tension. The Princeton
Principles recognized this danger in its introduction:
Improper exercises of criminal jurisdiction, including universal
jurisdiction, may be used merely to harass political opponents, or for
209
aims extraneous to criminal justice.

The stated purpose of the Princeton Principles is to set up guidelines
for the exercise of universal jurisdiction to help keep this concern in
check. 210 Perhaps genocide or torture, due to the extreme heinousness
of those crimes, have reasons that support the use of universal
jurisdiction. But as demonstrated above, piracy no longer has good
reasons to support the exercise of universal jurisdiction. By allowing
piracy to remain subject to universal jurisdiction, the concern of
causing international tension remains as it is possible that states will
prosecute individuals for piracy for less than legitimate reasons. This
fear is heightened in the area of piracy because of the ambiguous
definition of piracy, which allows for much flexibility in the
21 1
interpretation of who is a pirate or what constitutes piracy.
B. Violation of Notions of Due Process
If pirates lose all of the privileges of the law, then allowing states
to exercise universal jurisdiction over them would not seem an issue
worthy of discussion. 212 But, does it follow that by cruising
piratically, the pirate loses all the rights and privileges of law as

209.
PRINCETON PRINCIPLES, supra note 98, at 24-25.
210.
Id. at 25.
211.
The situation in Darfur may serve to undercut this argument to some
extent, but the Author feels that genocide enjoys a more consistent and less varying
definition than does piracy.
212.
If they are not subject to the privileges of law, then it would not be offensive
to hail them into any court in any state, even though that state has never had any
connection with the pirate. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
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Blackstone suggested? 213 What is so special about piracy that would
cause those who practice it to lose the protection of the law? If
someone murders his neighbor, he violates the law of nearly every
country in the world. Does the murderer lose the procedural rights
and protections of the law? Absolutely not. 214 It would also be absurd
to suggest that every individual in the world would have the right to
go after a murderer, as Gentili would have every individual go after
the pirate. 2 15 Further, it would hardly be proper for a nation, that
had no territorial connection with the murder, murderer, or the
victim, to capture the murderer, haul him into its court, subject him
to its judicial process, and punish him in accordance with its laws and
its penal system.
Part of the problem with the current system is the pirate is not
afforded due process rights. Due process and terms related to it, such
as fundamental fairness, are rather vague and not subject to a rigid
definition. 2 16 According to Judge Wald and the D.C. Circuit Court of
Appeals, "[iut is universally agreed that adequate notice lies at the
heart of due process. ' 217 The idea of due process is not solely an U.S.
idea. The U.S. Constitution's Due Process Clause has its origins in
the Magna Carta, 218 and the notion that all people have the right to
due process has recently been recognized and codified in the
international arena. 2 19 Notice, in all situations, seems to be the
touchstone. It is notice that the pirate lacks when a country exercises,
universal jurisdiction over him because he cannot know in advance to
whose law he will be subject.
When a person commits murder, he knows which laws will
govern him. In the United States, the murderer knows that he will be

213.
See id.
214.
See e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 560 (2003) ("By protecting even
those convicted of heinous crimes, th[is] . .. reaffirms the duty of the government to
respect the dignity of all persons."). This point is rather self-evident. Every murderer in
the United States must be given due process of law. They enjoy all the protections and
privileges of the law. To list every state that also affords procedural rights to the
murderer would be rather pointless.
215.
GENTILI, supra note 115, at 204. This sounds more like vigilantism than
any form of legal procedure.
216.
Lowell B. Howard, Jr., Case Comment, Cleveland Board of Education v.
Loudermill: Procedural Due Process Protection for Public Employees, 47 OHIO ST. L.J.
1115, 1120-21 (1986).

217.
Gray Panthers v. Schweiker, 652 F.2d 146, 168 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
Robert Riggs, Substantive Due Process in 1791, 1990 WISC. L. REV. 941, 948
218.
(1990) ('The ancestry of the due process clause is universally traced to chapter 39 of
the Magna Carta.").
219.
See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights arts. 9, 14-15,
Mar. 23, 1976, 999 U.N.T.S. 173. Though more rigid than the U.S. Constitution's Due
Process Clause, it is an attempt to codify at the international level the notions of the
Due Process Clause.
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subject to the laws of the state in which he commits the murder. 220
The murderer may have committed the murder in that state only
because he valued the murder more than the risk of getting caught
and the maximum penalty that state would impose. Suppose the state
he committed the murder in would only punish him with a term of
twenty years in prison. To the murderer, this was an acceptable trade
off. He might not have committed the murder, however, had the state
had the death penalty. The important point though is that he had the
opportunity to consider the penalty before committing the murder
221
because he knew which state would hold him accountable.
The pirate though may not have this same notice in a world in
which any country can exercise jurisdiction over him using the
universality principle. He cannot determine beforehand whose law
will apply until some country catches him. He may choose to prey
solely upon Argentinean ships because Argentina only punishes
piracy with three to fifteen years imprisonment if murder is not
committed during the attack. 222 He may have decided that pirating
Argentinean ships was worth the risks of Argentina prosecuting him.
He might have chosen not to prey upon U.S. shipping, however,
because it was not worth the risk of spending life in prison. In this
way, he is just like the murderer in his thinking. In theory, however,
the United States, could capture the pirate, punish him under U.S.
law, and sentence him to life in prison. This, despite his thinking that
only Argentinean law would apply since he only plundered that
country's ships.
The above illustrates why the pirate is not afforded due process
when the only basis for exercising jurisdiction over him is universal
jurisdiction. He has no way to determine in advance not only who will
capture him but also who will punish him. To treat the murderer like
the pirate would be to allow Canada to prosecute the U.S. murderer
who murders a fellow citizen in North Dakota.
While universal jurisdiction denies the pirate due process, other
forms of jurisdiction would not. Using the flag-state principle, the
pirate knows that he is subject to the law of the ship's flag that he
attacks. Using the nationality principle, he knows he is always
subject to the laws of his state of citizenship. Lastly, using the passive
personality principle, he knows that he is subject to whichever state
may count his victims as a citizen. In all of these situations, he can

220.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and
district wherein the crime shall have been committed... ") (emphasis added).
221.
One would be reasonable in asking why the author did not use a negligent
tortfeasor as the example because he does not choose to be negligent. Piracy is a crime
of choice. The pirate consciously chooses to plunder a ship. This makes piracy more
akin to deliberate murder than a negligent tortfeasor.
222.
See supra note 175 and accompanying text.
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determine in advance what state or states may exercise jurisdiction
over him. This is unlike a situation where universal jurisdiction is
used because in that situation, any state in the world could punish
him under its laws. He would have no way of knowing what his
possible punishment would be until after he commits piracy and a
country captures him.
Another way to explain why a pirate's right to due process is
violated by universal jurisdiction is to consider the minimum contacts
test used in the United States to determine whether a state can
exercise personal jurisdiction over a civil defendant. In Phillips
Petroleum Company v. Shutts, Chief Justice Rehnquist stated that:
An out-of-state defendant summoned by a plaintiff is faced with the full
powers of the forum State to render judgment against it. The defendant
must generally hire counsel and travel to the forum to defend itself
from the plaintiffs claim, or suffer a default judgment. The defendant
may be forced to participate in extended and often costly discovery, and
will be forced to respond in damages or to comply with some other form
of remedy imposed by the court should it lose the suit. The defendant
may also face liability for court costs and attorney's fees. These burdens
are substantial, and the minimum contacts requirement of the Due
Process Clause prevents the forum State from unfairly imposing them
22 3
upon the defendant.

Surely, the burdens a criminal defendant faces, loss of liberty and
possibly life, are at least as great if not greater than the burdens a
civil defendant faces. Thus, it seems that at a minimum, a state
should not be allowed to exercise jurisdiction over a criminal
224
defendant unless the minimum contacts test is met.
There is no need to go into detail to determine whether the
minimum contacts test is met. The court has made quite clear that
the test is not met if the defendant has no contacts at all with the
state seeking to exercise jurisdiction. 22 5 A state only has to base its
exercise of jurisdiction on the universality principle if it has no other
contacts with the defendant on which to base jurisdiction. Put
another way, when a state bases jurisdiction solely on the
universality principle, that state is acknowledging that it has no
contacts with the defendant. This means that universal jurisdiction
does not meet the minimum contacts test and therefore, its exercise
over pirates is a violation of notions of due process.

223.
472 U.S. 797, 808 (1985).
224.
This is not an issue in the United States because of the Sixth Amendment,
which states that only the state in which the crime is committed can try the criminal
defendant. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI. This ensures that the minimum contacts test
will always be met. This also explains why there is no discussion of minimum contacts
in case law relating to the criminal defendant usually.
225.
Phillips Petroleum, 472 U.S. at 806 (discussing InternationalShoe, Chief
Justice Rehnquist states that "the Due Process Clause did not permit a State to make a
binding judgment against a person with whom the State had no contacts... ").
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This is not to say that every exercise of universal jurisdiction is a
violation of due process. Some crimes may be so heinous that they
constitute exceptions to the normal notions of due process. Perhaps
piracy was one such crime in the past, but as illustrated in Part III,
this is no longer true. Therefore, it should not count as an exception
and the pirate should be afforded due process.
Because of the potential for tension in international relations
exercises of universal jurisdiction poses, and the fact that its use to
punish pirates violates notions of due process, states should no longer
be allowed to exercise universal jurisdiction over pirates.
This concern may sound more theoretical than practical. It is a
fair question to ask how often a state exercises universal jurisdiction
226
to prosecute pirates. Traditionally, states have rarely exercised it.
But recently, China executed several pirates, not all of whom were
Chinese. 22 7 India also recently tried and convicted a number of
pirates using universal jurisdiction. 228 In early 2006, the United
States detained and searched an Arab sailing vessel (or dhow) it
captured fifty-four miles from Somalia and questioned its crew of
twenty-six-ten Somali men and sixteen Indians. The IMB alleged
that the dhow may be linked to an attack on a Bahamian flagged
ship. 229 At the time this is written, it is still uncertain what will
happen to those who were detained. The point is that the fear is not
purely theoretical and countries are actually starting to use universal
jurisdiction to punish pirates. If there are no solid reasons for
continuing to use universal jurisdiction, it should not be used to avoid
these risks.
V. SOLUTIONS

This Note discussed the history of piracy, the reasons for
originally subjecting pirates to universal jurisdiction, why those
reasons no longer make sense, and why universal jurisdiction should
no longer apply to pirates. There are several solutions to the
currently flawed system. First, retaining the status quo is always an
option. Second, and at the opposite extreme, another option would be
to create a truly international piracy regulatory regime. Lastly, states
could just stop subjecting pirates to universal jurisdiction and instead
resort to less controversial, and less dangerous, forms of jurisdiction

See Rubin, supranote 27, at 139-40.
226.
227.
See supra notes 158, 189 and accompanying text.
228.
WILLIAM LANGEWIESCHE, THE OUTLAW SEA 34-83 (2004) (describing the
pirates that attacked the Alondra Rainbow and noting that India, which tried the
pirates, had no connection whatsoever with the attack).
229.
See 26 Men Held by U.S. for Possible Piracy, KAN. CITY STAR, Jan. 23, 2006,
at A8.
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such as the flag-state principle, the nationality principle, or the
passive personality principle.

A. Retain the Status Quo
Doing nothing and retaining the status quo is always an option,
and this Author harbors no illusion that this is the option many
people may see as the best solution. It is true that pirates are not the
most sympathetic of criminals. Despite, however, causing tens of
millions of dollars in losses to international shipping and several lives
each year, piracy seems to pale in comparison to other international
problems such as the war on terror and global warming. Admittedly,
the current system is efficient. Allowing any state to capture pirates
and penalize those pirates according to its laws does away with
hassles over extradition or creation of international courts. 230 As this
Note has already pointed out though, there are problems with the
current system. These problems illuminate the need for a better
option than universal jurisdiction.

B. Creation of an InternationalPiracyRegulatory Regime
The opposite of doing nothing would be changing the whole
system. This would involve doing several things. First, a new
definition of piracy will need to be developed. Second, a court with
international jurisdiction over the crime of piracy must be created.
Then an international navy will need to be developed to hunt down
the pirates. Lastly, universal, or near universal, acceptance of this
plan would need to be obtained.
As has been mentioned on more than one occasion, the countries
of the world need to rework the current definition of piracy. The
drafters of the new definition should consider things such as whether
maritime terrorism is or is not piracy. Most importantly, an
international punishment for piracy must be determined. Currently,
by committing piracy, the pirate can be sentenced anywhere from
three years in prison to life (and possibly to death) depending on
which state captures him. 23 1 If piracy is a truly international crime,
then it should have an internationally agreed upon penalty. After all,
the presence of a uniform punishment was one of the hallmarks of the
world's way of dealing with piracy up until a hundred years ago.
Next, the world must establish a court with jurisdiction over the
crime of piracy. With the creation of the International Criminal Court

230.
Extradition can be cumbersome as illustrated by the Lockerbie bombing
which took from November 14, 1991, to April 5, 1999, to extradite the accused. See

Marlise Simmons, 2 Libyan Suspects Handed to Court in Pan Am Bombing, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 6, 1999, at Al, A14.
231.
See supra notes 169-75 and accompanying text.
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(ICC), the international community has shown a willingness to cooperate in the suppression of international crime. 23 2 Unfortunately,
not all countries who are members of the United Nations have
submitted to the ICC. 233 Additionally, the treaty giving rise to the
court would need to be amended to include piracy. 23 4 It does not seem
appropriate to create an international pirate court from scratch when
an already existing court will suffice.
Not only would there need to be an international court to try
pirates, but also there would need to be some international way of
handling the punishment of pirates. It does not seem fair to tell a
country that it cannot try a pirate under its laws, but then to force it
to imprison the pirate for a number of years. 235 The solution is to also
create an international prison in which to hold the convicted pirates.
If a country cannot try them, it will also not want to have to go
out and capture the pirates. What interest does the Brazilian Navy
have in catching pirates in the Malacca Straits so long as those
pirates are not disturbing Brazilian shipping? There is just not
enough of an incentive to want to go out and capture pirates that
would justify marshalling the resources to do so effectively. Therefore,
keeping with the international nature of the crime of piracy, the
world should also maintain an international navy whose job is to
catch pirates.
The creation of a truly international piracy regime seems to best
reflect the world's feelings on piracy and the reality this Note has
shown. The pirate would not be deprived of his rights to due process
of law by some random country punishing him for crimes he
committed against another country. He also would know in advance
what his punishment would be if he was caught. And, it would be
fitting to deal with one of the world's oldest international crimes in
such an international way. So, why has this method not been adopted
already? The world has not adopted it because it is more akin to the
utopian thinking of a high school student eager to change the world,
rather than a practical solution. The costs of doing this would be
greater than the losses piracy inflicts. The idea of the countries of the
world uniting against the pirates of the world is laudable but
probably is not going to happen in the near future. Thus, this solution
should not be adopted.

232.
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187
U.N.T.S. 91.
233.
Notably, the United States has not ratified the treaty establishing the ICC.
See Sean D. Murphy, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to
InternationalLaw, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 706, 724 (2002).
234.
See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 232, art.
121.
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C. Rely Solely on Other Forms of Jurisdiction
Usually, the best answer to a question rarely lies at one of the
extremes. Dealing with piracy is no exception. The best solution
would be to drop universal jurisdiction and instead, rely on more
conventional forms of jurisdiction such as the flag-state principle, the
nationality principle, and the passive personality principle.
The general rule used to be that once a ship was used for
piratical purposes, it lost its nationality. 23 6 That general rule has
been modified by Art. 104 of the UNCLOS, which now allows each
state to determine whether or not those ships bearing its flag will be
stripped of that flag by engaging in piracy. 23 7 If they do not strip the
ship of its flag, then that state would have a basis for exercising
jurisdiction over the pirates using the ship. Also, even if the pirate
ship lost its flag by engaging in piracy, the victim ship would not lose
its flag and so the victim ship's flag state could exercise jurisdiction
over the pirates. 238 Further, the nationality or passive personality
principles would also allow a state to exercise jurisdiction over a
pirate that had injured its interests.
As to the capturing of pirates, allowing any state to capture the
pirate, as is the current practice, may be worth retaining. It is more
efficient to allow any state to capture a pirate, and then, once
captured, to extradite the pirate to the state that can exercise
23 9
jurisdiction over him. There are obvious problems with extradition,
but it better assures that the pirate is afforded due process of law by
ensuring the proper country is prosecuting him.
Lastly, this Author would suggest that piracy be redefined.
While this Author can offer no suggestions as to what that new
definition should look like, this Note has pointed out a number of
problems that should be reviewed. Because part of the UNCLOS will
need to be changed anyway to get rid of the universal jurisdiction
provision, its definition might as well be fixed.
The attractive part of this solution is that it requires little
change. Dropping the use of universal jurisdiction would prevent
violations of the pirate's right to due process, thereby making this

236.
See supra notes 102-09 and accompanying text.
237.
See UNCLOS, supra note 4, art. 104.
238.
There are a couple of potential situations where there would be no state
that could exercise flag-state jurisdiction. If a country believes that the current
definition of piracy allows for situations where mutiny is seen as piracy and that state
adopts the view that a ship engaged in piracy loses its flag, then there would be no
basis for flag state jurisdiction. Other forms of jurisdiction, however, such as
nationality or passive personality would still exist. See e.g., Ray August, International
Cyber.Jurisdiction:A ComparativeAnalysis, 39 AM. Bus. L. J. 531, 540 n.48 (2002).
239.
See Kai I. Redbane, Note, Extradition and Individual Rights: The Need for
an International Criminal Court to Safeguard Individual Rights, 19 FORDHAM INT'L
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solution better than the first proposal. Also, this solution does not
require the creation of a new international regime as would the
previous solution. Most importantly, it is a practical solution that can
be easily implemented. For these reasons, this solution should be
adopted and universal jurisdiction should no longer be applied to
piracy.
VI. CONCLUSION

Piracy is an age old crime that has plagued the world's shipping
in the past, plagues it today, and will likely plague it into the
foreseeable future. It is hard to imagine that piracy could be
eradicated overnight. Therefore, the problem must be dealt with in an
effective manner. But in doing so, the due process rights of the
pirates should not be violated in the way that universal jurisdiction
allows.
If universal jurisdiction ever applied to piracy, it did so only in
the past, and the reasons for applying it do not comport with modern
times. To exercise universal jurisdiction over pirates today is
fundamentally unfair. Professor
Rubin described
universal
jurisdiction in the following way:
It can be concluded that "universal jurisdiction" was at best a rule of
international law only for a limited period of time and under political
circumstances that no longer apply; at worst it was merely a British
attribution to the international legal order of substantive rules
forbidding "piracy" and authorizing all nations to apply their laws
against it on the high seas, based on a model of imperial Rome, and
British racial and commercial ambitions that never did reflect deeper
realities, as part of the rationalization of imperialism never really
240
persuasive outside of England alone.

If universal jurisdiction is not exercised over pirates, another
means of bringing them to justice is required. Having considered a
number of possibilities, the best solution is to rely on other forms of
jurisdiction. There are forms of jurisdiction available that are less
controversial and less likely to cause international tensions. Why risk
damaging international relations by exercising universal jurisdiction
over a pirate when other options are available? States should no
longer exclaim that all people deserve the right to due process and
then so clearly violate the due process rights of the pirate. States
must no longer exercise universal jurisdiction over the pirate.
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